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DEEP SEABED MINING AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Roy Lee*

I must begin by admitting to certain limitations in making a
presentation of this precise issue. As Mr. Hull has mentioned, I am
a member of the United Nations Secretariat, not a delegate of a
developing country. Therefore, I am in a difficult position either to
defend or to advocate the positions of developing countries. Instead,
I will act as a reporter summarizing the views of the developing
countries on the various issues of seabed mining which have been
expressed during the last few years at different times and in different forums.
Also, I ought to mention that although the 120 developing countries act as a group in expressing some of the basic policy issues at
public meetings or in private consultations, there are differences of
opinion regarding detailed provisions. Sometimes it is difficult to
identify clearly the view of the group as a whole. 1n these cases, I
think we will have to refer to the views as expressed by some of the
developing countries.
For the sake of convenience, I will present the views of the
developing countries on the following group of issues: first, the Declaration of Principles and the value of seabed mining; second, the
role of the Enterprise; and third, the institutional arrangements. I
will present the views as best as I understand them and as objectively as possible.
Earlier, I commented on the Declaration, but here my task is
to present you with the view of the Group of 77 regarding the Declaration of Principles. This declaration is extremely important for the
developing countries because it lays the foundation for the promotion of peaceful uses of the international seabed and its resources.
It establishes the principles of common heritage of mankind, nonappropriation, joint exploitation of seabed resources for the benefit
of all, and equitable sharing of the benefit by all. Furthermore, the
Declaration on the basis of these principles, commits the international community to the establishment of an international regime
and a machinery applicable to the area and its resources.
At the last session in September, the chairman of the Group of
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77 made a statement on the issue of unilateral legislative action. I
will now paraphrase some of the points made at that session. First,
the Declaration is a solemn pronouncement by the most representative organ of the international community. The General Assembly
proclaimed that the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction were the common heritage of mankind. While such resources
could be exploited under an international regime, they could not be
unilaterally appropriated nor could they be exploited by an individual nation.
Second, all states, by adopting the Declaration without dissent,
had accepted the common heritage principle, the international
character of the seabed and its resources, and the inevitable legal
consequences. Unilateral exploitation was incompatable with these
principles.
Third, the Declaration was the result of several years of preparatory work and intensive negotiations in the General Assembly and
in the committee in which all states participated. The Declaration,
therefore, is a text which establishes a prin"ciple of international law
precisely within the meaning of article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. 1 It expresses the opinion of the international community and embodies current international law regarding the regime of the seabed.
Fourth, unilateral legislative action, by a state or a group of
states, regarding exploitation of the international seabed before a
universally agreed international regime was established, would be
contrary to the Declaration. It would also be contrary to international law.
Fifth, as was agreed at the beginning of the conference, the
present negotiations on the seabed regime and machinery constitute
an integral part of a package deal upon which the whole treaty of
the law of the sea is to be constructed. The Group of 77 reaffirmed
the inseparability and interrelatedness of the different aspects of the
law of the sea currently being negotiated at the Conference in the
various committees. Unilateral legislative action would, therefore,
prejudice present negotiations, and might well precipitate a chaotic
situation with regard to law of the sea. The failure of such an important conference would adversely affect the whole system of multilateral negotiations and would result in repercussions within the
United Nations for generations to come.
1. l.C.J. Stat., art. 38.
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After this statement was reaffirmed by the Group of 77, it was
supported by several developed countries including: Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Australia. The
United States also issued a supporting statement which was endorsed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium,
and Japan.
It is necessary to emphasize that while the industrial countries
have one very clear and concrete objective, seabed mining, the developing countries have much broader and more general goals. In
the following illustrations, I will explain how the developing countries perceive the issue of seabed mining. It is hoped that this will
make their position more understandable and will facilitate negotiations.
You may recall that in 1967 a large sector of the international
community expressed anxiety over the competitive military exploitation of the strategic potential of the seabed and the ocean floor
beyond national jurisdiction. A U .N. Committee was established in
order to divert this trend. Its initial purpose was to exclude military
uses of the seabed and to promote peaceful uses. It was against this
historical background that the present First Committee of the law
of the sea conference executed their tasks. This represents a commitment on the part of the developing countries and the international community, as a whole, to devote the potential of the seabed
and its resources to peaceful uses.
The question of seabed mining is not just a simple problem of
money; it goes far beyond the issue of sharing the financial benefit.
For the developing countries, the question is how to implement
faithfully the international seabed regime and machinery which
were proclaimed by the Declaration. In their view, seabed mining
must be conducted in conformity with the principles already declared by the General Assembly, particularly the principle of the
common heritage of mankind. To them, this principle means that
exploitation of resources must be a joint operation by all who are
interested. Developing countries are opposed to the idea of leaving
exploitation of the seabed resources to a few private firms and companies. All activities must be carried out by an internationalized
agency on behalf of mankind. It is mankind, through whatever
agency it may decide to appoint, that has the right to dispose of the
resources in one way or another. According to the developing countries, the Authority cannot be just an administrative body, it must
have the discretionary power to select its agencies.
Many devel"ping countries recognize that this is the first time
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that property will be entrusted to an international organization
which will administer and manage the area and its resources on
behalf of mankind. Therefore, seabed mining provides a unique
opportunity for the world community to share in the benefits of
resource exploitation. This is why developing nations prefer an international exploitation system.
Some of the developing countries view the forthcoming international regime machinery as an example of measures which may be
taken in the context of the establishment of a new international
economic order. This is the reason why they have insisted that the
treaty embody some general economic policies. However, for some
developed countries this is not relevant, and it simply presents an
obstacle to the negotiations.
In multilateral negotiations, all these views are equally valid
and cannot be disregarded. They must be respected and taken into
account. I do not think this is different from any other democratic
decision making processes. I understand that in Syracuse you are
facing a controversial issue concerning the building of a new stadium. In the last four years, various views have been expressed. However radical they may seem, the viewpoints put forth by one side
have to be respected by the other side in the process of decision
making.
As Mr. Young mentioned, some of the developing countries
have also emphasized the question of technology transfer. I think it
should be made clear that these countries are not only interested in
the recovery system or the processing techniques. Instead, as in the
area of space exploration, they are interested in the potential application of seabed technology. Overemphasis on the questions of patents and propriety rights would miss the point completely. Such an
interpretation would not be conducive to a general understanding
of the broader issues that are at the heart of the negotiations.
Perhaps this shows that it would be wrong to view seabed mining purely as a commercial operation of economic interests. I hope
these examples illustrate the fact that developing countries see the
issue of seabed mining in a broad perspective. Perhaps, they will
help to explain the positions taken by the developing countries on
the issues of the exploitation system, the production ceilings, and
the institutional arrangements.
My next topic concerns the views of developing countries on the
role of the Enterprise. The above presentation should clearly explain why the developing countries cannot accept a licensing or a
concession approach to seabed mining. Instead, they are now conhttps://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/5
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sidering a parallel system. For some developing countries the parallel exploitation system would entail the acceptance of state companies and multinationals as cutthroat competitors. This would create
a drastic change in the developing nations' conception of the Enterprise's role. Previously, these countries viewed the Enterprise as the
sole and exclusive operational arm of the Authority. Therefore, acceptance of a parallel system is viewed as a great concession since
it would place the Enterprise in the disadvantageous position of
competing with private firms and state companies which have advanced technology and management experience. This explains why
the developing countries think that the treaty should give the Enterprise certain favorable conditions in terms of financing and technology. I believe we will hear more on these issues from Ambassador
Aldrich.
Another concern of some of the developing countries is the absence of a guaranteed market for the Enterprise. In the present text,
the Enterprise has to submit a workable plan for the approval by
the Legal and Technical Commission. As we shall see, the developing nations believe that the Legal and Technical Commission is
under the control of the industrial countries, and, therefore, it would
not allow the Enterprise to have an effective role.
I will now discuss the views of the developing nations on some
of the institutional arrangements. First, although the treaty characterizes the Assembly as the supreme organ of the Authority, some
of the developing countries believe that such a characterization is
purely cosmetic. Their reasoning is that a careful examination
would indicate that the substantive powers and functions are allocated to the Council and some of the functional commissions. The
Assembly, like the General Assembly, functions as a forum for views
and policy statements. The actual control remains in the hands of
the Council and the functional commissions. Furthermore, most of
the functions entrusted to the Assembly cannot be exercised unless
a recommendation has been made by the council. There is also a
provision in Article 1562 regarding noninterference between the
2. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Sixth Session, Informal Composite
Negotiating Text, U.N . Doc. A/Conf. 52/WP.10 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 1108
(1977). Section 5, article 156, paragraph 4 in speaking of organs of the authority states:
the principal organs shall each be responsible for exercising those powers and functions which have been conferred on them. In exercising such powers and functions,
each organ shall act in a manner compatible with the distrubution of powers and
functions among the various organs of the authority as provided for in this part of
the present convention.
id.
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major organs of the Authority. According to this provision, no organ
is allowed to interfere with another organ.
There are these built-in constitutional constraints as well as
certain procedural constraints. According to the present text, the
decisions of the Assembly must be made by a two-thirds majority,
present and voting. However, there is another provision whereby
one-fifth of the members, when considering an issue for the first
time, may defer a decision. There is also a provision that onequarter of the members may request an advisory opinion after a
decision has been made. In the view of some of the developing countries, these provisions will inevitably delay the decision-making process and thereby affect the effectiveness of the Assembly. In other
words, it is their opinion that the Assembly is not going to be as
effective as some other advocates have claimed.
Now I will discuss the Council, which is the executive organ. It
is composed of thirty-six members, eighteen of which will be allocated for interest groups and the remainder will be allocated according to geographical distribution. Decisions are to be made by a
three-quarter majority of the members present and voting provided
that such a majority includes a majority of the members participating in that session. According to some of the developing countries,
under the present composition and decision making procedures, the
Council will be more readily influenced by the developed countries
than by the developing nations.
Developing countries view the Council as the most powerful
organ because of its great variety of powers. For example, it may
issue directives to the Enterprise and examine control over its activities; it may adopt and apply rules, regulations, and procedures; it
may initiate proceedings before the seabed dispute chamber; and it
may issue emergency orders. The power of the Council is in article
160, paragraph 2, subitem 10. 3 Under subparagraph 10, a recommendation from the Legal and Technical Commission on the issuance of a contract would remain.valid, if, after sixty days the Council has not adopted a different decision. In other words, once the
3. id. Section 5, article 160, paragraph 2, subitem 10 states:
In addition the Council shall . . . approve on behalf of the Authority, after review
by the Technical Commission, formal written plans of work, for the conduct of
activities in the Area, drawn up in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 151. In so
doing the Council shall act expeditiously. The plan of work shall be deemed to have
been approved, unless a decision to disapprove it is taken within 60 days of its
submission by the Technical Commission.
id., Section 5, article 160, paragraph 2, subitem x.
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Technical and Legal Commission made a recommendation, it would
be very difficult for the Council to change the Commission's decision. In the view of developing nations, this provision anticipates a
situation of paralysis in the Council. In the event of such a situation,
the recommendation by the Technical and Legal Commission could
still be implemented even though the Council would be paralyzed.
Finally I will discuss the Legal and Technical Commission.
Some of the developing countries believe that the Legal and Technical Commission is the most important commission, because, as I
have already mentioned, it approves or disapproves of plans of work
submitted by a private contractor or by an enterprise. Under the
present text, the developing countries fear that because of the requirement of qualification of the members of the Legal and Technical Commission, the commission would be more readily influenced
by the developed countries. This is because the members will be
composed of delegates largely from the developed nations. These
members are nominated by state party, and are elected by the
Council.
The developing countries also have very specific views on the
question of production policy, financial arrangements, and the system of exploitation. However, we have other distinguished speakers
who will deal with these topics this afternoon.
In conclusion, I believe that we are facing a Solomon-type situation in which two women claimed the same child as their own. The
solution was to cut the child in half. From the above presentation
it should be clear that developing countries think that the Assembly
will be paralyzed. Others also believe that the Council will be paralyzed. Now what is next? Are we going to paralyze the functional
commissions as well, simply because of the divergent interests? I
think the trend is very discouraging. While all interests and concerns should be taken into account and protected, the solution we
are seeking must protect the basic objective that we are looking for
in this area.
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PANEL DISCUSSION
MR. HULL: Thank you, Roy. Before I turn the discussion to the
panelists, let me try to clarify a couple of terms that you have heard
today, probably for the first time in some instances. When we talk
about the Enterprise, the Assembly, the Council, the Seabed Dispute Chamber, and the Legal and Technical Commission, we are
talking about segments of the International Authority. The Authority is the overall body which is recognized as playing an important
role in the exploitation of the deep seabed. The second term that
you have heard just now is the Group of 77. I am not sure, at this
point, if the Group of 77 is up to 116, 118, or 120 today. What the
term refers to is a group that was first formed in Caracas in 1974.
At that time there were some seventy-seven countries in the developing world which banded together to develop what was viewed as
a common position. The differences between today and 1974 are:
first, instead of seventy-seven countries there are 120, and second,
there is no common position. With that clarification, I would like
to turn the discussion over to the speakers.
MR. HERMAN: I would like to ask Roy Lee a couple of questions.
Before doing so, I should preface what I have to say by stating that
these are my personal comments and reflections. They do not represent the views of the Canadian government.
Let us assume that there are real problems with the Law of the
Sea Conference and that those problems involve both process and
substance. I have proposals for dealing with the process, but let us
look at the substance. In my view, the substance is too complex to
be resolved in the next few years. If we could improve on the substance by simplification of the issues in a way which did not meet
with every preoccupation of the developing countries, but which
would pretty well insure that we got a treaty tomorrow, then I think
it is possible. Perhaps it would be politically difficult, but I think it
possible. What would be the advantages? I must speak very generally because of the time limitations.
It seems to me that we could get a treaty if we organized a
council system which provided for some type of concurrent majority,
which admittedly the developing countries do not like; if we abolished some of the transfer of technology provisions; if we provided
for a fairly simplified and unstructured system of financial obligations; and if we provided assurances that the Enterprise would have
some means of getting into business. I want to leave aside the question of production ceilings because I have not quite figured out how
that would work into this structure. I may be oversimplifying, but I
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think we could get a treaty. The result would be a tremendous
symbolic achievement for the United Nations system. We would
have an international body which, for the first time, would have
some sort of regulatory authority over resources. I cannot think of
anything in the long term which is more important than that. I
wondered if you had any thoughts from the standpoint of the developing countries and from the point of view of a United Nations civil
servant on that kind of approach, an approach which admittedly
would not meet many of the preoccupations of the developing countries.
MR. LEE: Yes; as I mentioned in the beginning, I am not a
delegate from the developing countries. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for me to answer as to what position they would take. But
I am glad you asked me about my views as a member of the United
Nations Secretariat. I could not agree with you more on the general
outline you just gave. I think it would be very significant to reach
such an agreement.
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Mr. Lee, you stated at the beginning of your remarks that the United Nations General Assembly
resolutions oppose unilateral exploitation of the deep seabed. Could
you comment on whether or not it would constitute unilateral exploitation of the deep seabed if one country proceeded with deep
seabed mining but set aside a reasonably determined percentage of
its revenues for distribution to mankind rather than for the benefit
of that individual nation? In other words, if the United States were
to set aside, say five percent of the profits from deep seabed mining
operations for distribution to mankind under such basis as a treaty
might develop, would that constitute exploitation in your
judgment?
MR. LEE: It would have been a very difficult question to answer
had not the Group of 77 made a clear statement on that issue. I have
told you what they have said and it is up to you to interpret their
opinion from that statement. I think that would constitute exploitation.
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Rather than asking Roy a question, because, as he said, he cannot speak for the Group of 77, I would
simply make a comment which, I think, might be helpful to the
audience. That is, of all ,the issues which Roy mentioned, I think the
single most important one is the issue of decision making-how
decisions are made within the International Seabed Authority. This
issue involves the roles and organs of the Council, the Assembly,
their composition, and their voting structure. What we find is that
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developing countries, in general, wish to see the new international
organization represent the principle of one nation, one vote, and to
the extent that there are any limited bodies such as the Council, the
developing nations think that such bodies should take into account
and give at least as much emphasis as possible to the concept of
equitable geographic representation. What the industrial countries
are saying, on the other hand, is that geographic representation has
absolutely no relation to anything that makes any sense in the
world. It does not have any relation to political questions, and more
importantly, for an organization which is going to control access to
what will eventually become a very important mineral resource, it
has no relation to economic interests. While we must, in the late
twentieth century, take into account and pay respect to the sovereign equality of states and the concept of one state, one vote, we
have to temper that respect with provisions which will recognize real
economic interests and which will try to give them at least a minimum degree of protection. Otherwise, industrialized nations cannot
be expected to agree to the treaty. I think this question may be the
most important single issue on which the possible success of the
Conference depends. How many of the key representatives of the
developing countries have really accepted the fact that if there is
going to be an International Seabed Authority, it is going to have
to give some deference to the recognition of real economic interests?
It is obvious that even when economics are ignored, the issue is seen
in terms of human democracy, there is no relation between one
state-one vote and the representation of people. It is, in any democratic sense, an absurdity.
The real economic interests are very narrowly limited in this
negotiation. I think the primary interests of the developing nations
concern assurance that the organization sets a precedent for movement toward the new economic international order by trying to take
a resource which is beyond national jurisdiction and seeing that it
is administered in a fashion that recognizes the developing nation's
interests, not simply the interests of those who are producers and
consumers. These nations also have a monetary interest in sharing
revenues, but realistically speaking, division of revenues amongst
120 developing countries cannot amount to more than a pittance in
the end.
Certainly, there is potential for larger shares of revenues from
petroleum production on the outer continental shelf than there is
from deep seabed mining. So, these nations do not very heavily
weigh the respective economic inflow of money from seabed mining.
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/5
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They have some interest in the technical education of their people
who will have jobs in the International Authority of the seabed
enterprise. They also have an interest in the people from their countries who will gain experience in the management of a large operational and regulatory body. But I think it is demonstratively clear
that no developing country is willing to allocate funds for seabed
mining. They have got more important priorities for their money,
and they are not about to invest anything in seabed mining. Very
few of the developing nations have significant markets for the minerals. The nickel, manganese, and cobalt from the seabed will go to
a handful of industrialized countries which need it for their industries. The capital to exploit the resources will come from an even
smaller number of industrialized countries.
The other major economic interests come from the countries
which produce the same metals from land sources. Ninety or ninetyfive percent of the real economic interest at stake rests with approximately twenty countries. Now, in my judgment, unless the developing countries recognize that the ninety or ninety-five percent economic interest has to be given reasonable assurances that actions
will not be taken by a body which is totally controlled through one
nation-one vote by a large majority of states which have a very
small economic interest and a high ideological interest, there will
not be any organization. That has been the toughest, longest fought,
and, perhaps, the least productive issue thus far in the negotiations.
It may be the last issue to be settled but it will have to be settled,
and these realities will have to be recognized if this organization is
going to be created. Thank you.
DR. McKELVEY: Roy you did an admirable job of technically
reporting the views of the developing countries. But I wonder if it
would not be fair and objective also to report that seabed resources
are the common heritage of mankind and should be developed for
the benefit of all mankind, especially with regard to the needs of the
developing countries. That phrase, I think, is one commonly used
throughout the Conference and I think it should be kept in mind in
explaining the views of the developing nations.
MR. LEE: Yes, I agree with you.
MR. HULL: Thank you very much, Roy.
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